gives some examples. If a good is both rival and excludable, it is a private good.
Ice cream is rival, because my consumption of it precludes you from consuming the same ice cream. The only way for you to consume it is to make more ice cream.
Ice cream is also excludable, because I can simply not share my ice cream with you.
Some goods are "impure" public goods because they are non-rival, but they are (to some extent) excludable.
Cable TV is non-rival, because my consumption of it in no way diminishes your consumption.
It is excludable, since the cable company can simply refuse to hook up the system. Other goods are "impure" public goods because they are rival, but not excludable.
For example, a crowded sidewalk is rival because your enjoyment is reduced as more pedestrians also use the same sidewalk.
Yet it is non-excludable because it is clearly very difficult to prohibit pedestrians from using the sidewalk.
Finally, pure public goods are both non-rival and non-excludable.
National defense is a classic example. It is non-rival because my consumption of national defense protection does not diminish your consumption of it.
It is also non-excludable, because once an area is protected, everyone "consumes" that protection.
Optimal Provision of Private Goods
Consider a private good, like ice cream. Figure 1 shows the market for ice cream cones, assuming that the alternative use of the money is buying cookies at $1 each.
Figure 1
This makes cookies the numeraire good. We can also represent this relationship mathematically. Ben has preferences over cookies (C) and ice cream (IC):
As does Jerry:
( )
Optimal Provision of Private Goods
Utility maximization requires that each of their indifference curves is tangent to the budget constraint. Moreover, suppliers set P=MC. For Ben, we have:
For Jerry we have:
The private market equilibrium in this case is socially efficient.
The MRS for any quantity of ice cream equals the SMB of that quantity-the marginal value to society equals the marginal value to any individual in the perfectly competitive market.
Now consider the tradeoff between a public good, like missiles, and a private good like cookies. Adding up Ben's and Jerry's willingness to pay for each quantity gives society's demand.
There is a market supply curve associated with producing missiles
Leading to a competitive equilibrium at 5 missiles. Ben & Jerry consume the same Q. Ben has a downward sloping demand curve for missiles.
Adding up Ben's and Jerry's willingness to pay gives society's demand for the 5 th missile.
As does Jerry.
Ben's willingness to pay for the first missile is $2.
While Jerry's willingness to pay for the first missile is $4. While Jerry's willingness to pay for the fifth missile is $2.
Ben's willingness to pay for the fifth missile is $1.
Figure 2 Demand for a public good
Optimal Provision of Public Goods Optimal Provision of Public Goods
We can also represent this relationship mathematically. Ben has preferences over cookies (C) and missiles (M):
To Ben, the marginal missile is worth Jerry's preferences are
To Jerry, the marginal missile is worth ( )
The social marginal benefit (SMB) of the next missile is the sum of Ben and Jerry's marginal rates of substitution:
where "i" represents each person in society.
Efficiency requires
That is, social efficiency is maximized when the marginal costs are set equal to the sum of the marginal rates of substitution (rather than each individual's MRS). This is because the good is non-rival. Since a unit can be consumed by all consumers, society would like the producer to take into account all consumers' preferences.
PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: Private-sector Underprovision
In general, the private sector underprovides public goods because of the free rider problem.
Consider two people, Ben and Jerry, and two consumption goods, ice cream and fireworks. Set the prices of each good at $1, but fireworks are a public good. Assume that Ben and Jerry have identical preferences.
Private-sector Underprovision
Ben and Jerry benefit equally from a firework that is provided by either of them.
What matters is the total amount of fireworks.
Each person chooses combinations of ice cream and fireworks in which his own MRS equals the ratio of price.
For both Ben and Jerry, they set:
Whereas optimal provision requires:
Private-sector Underprovision
With identical preferences, the optimal condition is:
Recall that marginal utilities diminish with increasing consumption of a good. In this example, optimal provision would require that fireworks are consumed until their utility equals half the marginal utility of ice cream. Thus, each individually buys too much ice cream privately. 
The Free Rider Problem in Practice The Free Rider Problem in Practice
There are some interesting examples of the freerider problem in practice.
Only 7.5% of public radio listeners in New York contribute to the stations-that is, there is a lot of freeriding. In the United Kingdom, the BBC charges an annual licensing fee for all television owners. Many users of file sharing services never contribute uploaded files; they only download files. Some of these services, like Kazaa, give download priority to those who contribute.
When Is Private Provision Likely to Overcome the Free Rider Problem?
Under what circumstances are private market forces likely to solve the free rider problem?
Intense preferences. Altruism. Utility from one's own contribution to the public good.
Some individuals care more than others
When some individuals have especially high demand for a public good, private provision may emerge (but not necessarily provide efficiently -in particular, the public good is still likely to be underprovided). The key intuition is that the decision to provide a public good is a function of the enjoyment that the individual gets from the total amount of the public good, net of cost.
If a person gets a lot of enjoyment, or has a lot of money, he will choose to purchase more of the public good even though it benefits others.
Altruism and Warm Glow
A second reason is that there is evidence that many individuals are altruistic, caring about the outcomes of others as well as themselves. A third reason is that that individuals may provide for a public good is due to warm glow.
The warm glow model is a model of public good provision in which individuals care about both the total amount of the public good and their particular contributions as well. For example, they may get some psychological benefit from knowing they helped a worthy cause. In this case, the public good becomes more like a private good, though it also does not fully solve the underprovision problems.
PUBLIC PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
In principle, the government could solve the optimal public goods provision problem and then either provide the good directly or mandate individuals to provide the amount. In practice, three problems emerge:
Crowd-out. Measuring costs and benefits. Determining the public's preferences.
Private Responses to Public Provision: The Problem of Crowd-Out
In some cases, the private market may already be providing a socially inefficient level of the private good.
In this case, public provision may crowd-out some of the private provision-as the government provides more of the public good, the private sector provides less.
For example, in the fireworks example with Ben and Jerry, if one assumes:
Ben and Jerry care only about the total number of fireworks provided. Government provision will be financed by charging equal amounts to each of them. And the government provides no more fireworks than were being provided privately beforehand.
Then each dollar of public provision will crowd out private provision one-for-one.
The full crowd-out in the fireworks example is rare, though partial crowd-out is much more common and can occur when:
People who don't contribute to the public good are taxed to finance its provision. Or when individuals derive utility from their individual contributions as well as the total amount of the public good provided.
If noncontributors are forced to help pay for the good (but it is still below the social optimum), then the contributors' effective income levels are higher than before. As a result of this income effect, contributors buy more if the public good is a normal good, offsetting the crowd-out to some extent.
Alternatively, as discussed previously, there may not be full crowd-out if an individual cares about his own contributions (the warm glow model). In this case, an increase in government contributions will not fully crowd out giving.
Public Provision of Public Goods: Measuring the costs and benefits of public goods
Another problem for government provision is measuring costs and benefits of the public good. This entails the field of cost-benefit analysis, discussed in the next lesson. For example, improving a highway involves valuations of commuting time saved as well reduced traffic fatalities.
How Can We Measure Preferences for the Public Good?
Finally, our model of optimal public good provision assumes the government knows each person's preferences over public and private goods. In practice, this runs into problems with preference revelation, preference knowledge, and preference aggregation. These issues are addressed in the field of political economy.
Let me work two problems…
